Abstract. We adapt the concept of a programmable hash function (PHF, Crypto 2008) to a setting in which a multilinear map is available. This enables new PHFs with previously unachieved parameters.
Introduction
Programmable hash functions. Programmable hash functions (PHFs) have been proposed in [18] as an abstraction of random oracles that can also be instantiated in the standard model. In a nutshell, a PHF H maps a bitstring the number of zeros of such a (nontrivial) linear function can be reasonably upper bounded. This contradicts the goal that a X = 0 for many, but not all X.
By moving to a multilinear setting, we essentially allow (a limited number of) multiplications in the exponent. Hence, the exponent a X is now no longer limited to be a linear function, but can be a multivariate polynomial. Such polynomials can have exponentially many zeros. For instance, we could choose secret values α i,b (for 1 ≤ i ≤ |X| and b ∈ {0, 1}), such that exactly one element of each pair (α i,0 , α i,1 ) is nonzero; say α i,bi = 0. Then the function
(where X i denotes the i-th bit of X) evaluates to zero everywhere except for X = (b 1 , . . . , b |X| ). In fact, we implement a suitable variant of the function in (1) in the exponent (in the sense that H(X) = c a X h b X = c α(X) h b X for a suitable blinding term h b X ) through multilinear maps. 3 In the process, we also recognize and refine an admissible hash function (AHF [3, 8, 1] ) implicit in [19] . This yields the -by far -most efficient known AHFs. As a result, we get PHFs in the multilinear setting with a X = 0 for many (but not all) X. Applications. To demonstrate their power, we use our new PHFs to replace random oracles in three example applications. As one application, we obtain from BLS signatures [6] an existing standard-model signature scheme due to Boneh and Silverberg [5] ; as a natural extension, we give a standard-model variant of the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme [4] . However, our central application is the SOK [23] ID-NIKE scheme; from this scheme, we get the first fully secure ID-NIKE in the standard model.
In all cases, the analysis is completely modular: we prove the security of the PHF-based schemes solely from generic PHF properties. In particular, we can also view (programmable) random oracles as PHFs to obtain the original schemes, with essentially the original proofs. 4 We view these results as strong evidence that PHFs are a useful abstraction of random oracles that also allows for standard-model instantiations.
In addition, we give natural hierarchical versions of all schemes in a setting with multilinear maps. (Recall that we require multilinear maps for our PHFs anyway.) Again, we can either use random oracles as PHFs to obtain reasonably efficient new schemes, or use our new PHFs to obtain (somewhat less efficient) standard-model versions. More on our ID-NIKE schemes. In the signature and IBE applications, we mainly explain (and slightly improve) existing schemes through PHFs. While this already hints at the potential of our notion of PHFs, their actual usefulness in building novel cryptographic functionalities is best demonstrated by our application to ID-NIKE.
Loosely speaking, a non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) provides any two parties registered in the system with a unique shared key, without any interaction. For NIKE in the identity-based setting, there is a single master public key held by a trusted authority (TA); each party additionally gets an individual user secret key from the TA, and combines its secret key with the identity of the other party to compute the shared key. This primitive is a powerful one. For one thing, it implies secure IBE under a minor technical requirement [20] . More importantly, it has important applications in managing keys and enabling secure communications in mobile ad hoc and sensor networks, where the energy cost of communication is at a premium [14, 9] . In the hierarchical setting, H-ID-NIKE allows the same functionality, but also allows the TA's operations to be distributed over a hierarchy, which is well-suited to military and emergency response scenarios. The advantages of ID-NIKE, in terms of reducing communication costs and latency in a realistic adversarial environment, are demonstrated in [9] . For further discussion of applications of NIKE and ID-NIKE, see [14, 12] .
However, ID-NIKE has proven surprisingly hard to instantiate in the standard model, even more so in a hierarchical setting. Currently, to the best of our knowledge, there is precisely one efficient, secure ID-NIKE scheme with a proof of security in the random oracle model, namely the SOK scheme [23] (with security models and analysis in [11, 20] ). There are no schemes secure in the standard model. One might think that such schemes could easily be obtained from known standard-model-secure IBE schemes, but this is not the case; the essential technical barrier seems to be the randomised key derivation in these IBE schemes.
In the hierarchical setting, Gennaro et al. [14] constructed H-ID-NIKE schemes that are secure under certain classes of key exposure, but which do not offer full security, the desirable and natural generalisation of the existing ID-NIKE security notion from [20] to the hierarchical setting. Moreover, their schemes do not scale well to large numbers of levels. The same criticisms apply to earlier schemes [2, 21] on which the scheme of Gennaro et al. [14] is based. Indeed, one of the open problems left in [14] is to construct a H-ID-NIKE scheme with security against not only compromise of any number of leaves, but also against any number of nodes at higher levels of the hierarchy.
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By substituting the random oracles in the SOK scheme [23] with our new PHFs, we obtain the first secure ID-NIKE schemes in the standard model. Furthermore, our construction extends naturally to the hierarchical setting, yielding the first fully secure H-ID-NIKE schemes. The construction can be instantiated using random oracles to obtain a reasonably efficient scheme, or using PHFs for security in the standard model. We also show how multilinear maps can be used to achieve security in the broader scenario of multiple TAs, and for shared keys among whole groups of parties.
Note on the recent candidate for multilinear maps. Recently, Garg, Gentry, and Halevi [13] have announced a candidate for a family of cryptographically interesting multilinear maps. Their candidate is lattice-based, heavily relies on the notion of noise, and thus does not provide groups in the usual sense. We comment on the necessary adaptations of our schemes to their setting inside.
Preliminaries
Notation. For n ∈ R, let [n] := {1, . . . , n }. Throughout the paper, k ∈ N denotes the security parameter. For a finite set S, we denote by s ← S the process of sampling s uniformly from S. For sets S 1 , S 2 , . . . and n ∈ N, we write
For a probabilistic algorithm A, we write y ← A(x) for the process of running A on input x with uniformly chosen random coins, and assigning y the result. If A's running time is polynomial in k, then A is called probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT). A function f : N → R is negligible if it vanishes faster than the inverse of any polynomial (i.e., if ∀c∃k 0 ∀k ≥ k 0 :
Multilinear maps. An -group system consists of cyclic groups G 1 , . . . , G of prime order p, along with bilinear maps e i,j : G i × G j → G i+j for all i, j ≥ 1 with i + j ≤ . Let g i be a canonical generator of G i (included in the group's description). The map e i,j satisfies e i,j (g
. When i, j are clear, we will simply write e instead of e i,j . It will also be convenient to abbreviate e(h 1 , . . . , h j ) := e(h 1 , e(h 2 , . . . , e(h j−1 , h j ) . . . )) for h j ∈ G ij and i = (i 1 + i 2 + . . . + i j ) ≤ . By induction, it is easy to see that this map is j-linear. Additionally, we define e(g) := g. Finally, it can also be useful to define the group G 0 = Z + |G1| of exponents to which this pairing family naturally extends. In the following, we will assume an -group system MPG = {{G i } i∈[ ] , p, {e i,j } i,j≥1,i+j≤ } generated by a multilinear maps parameter generator MG on input a security parameter 1 k .
The GGH candidate. We currently do not have candidates for multilinear maps between groups with cryptographically hard problems. However, Garg, Gentry, and Halevi [13] (henceforth GGH) suggest a concrete candidate for an "approximation" of multilinear maps, named graded encoding systems. With the GGH candidate, group elements have a randomized (and thus non-unique) representation dubbed "encoding". While it is possible to extract a unique "canonical bitstring" from an encoding, it is not possible to perform further computations with this extracted bitstring. An encoding can be re-randomized (e.g., to hide the sequence of operations that were performed), but only at the cost of introducing an artificial "noise" term in the encoding. Further operations (and re-randomizations) on this group element cause the noise to grow; once this noise grows beyond a certain bound, encodings can no longer be worked with.
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Our abstraction. For readability and universality, we will generally use the notation from the abstract notion of multilinear maps described above. When instantiated with the GGH candidate, operations are meant to occur on encodings, without implicit re-randomizations. In particular, e.g., g now denotes an encoding (not a group element). Additionally, we will employ the following notation to indicate necessary re-randomizations, extractions, and comparisons when using encodings instead of group elements.
-g ← G i means choosing a random encoding g at level i. (This corresponds to uniformly choosing a group element from G i .) We assume that encodings g chosen in such a way have a low noise level, say, 1. -g enc = h holds iff the encodings g and h match.
-g grp = h holds iff the group elements encoded by g and h match, that is, iff the GGH isZero procedure identifies g −1 h as the neutral element.
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-reRand j (g) is the re-randomization of encoding g. This re-randomization increases the noise level to a certain, a-priori fixed bound j. For simplicity, and abstracting, we only consider noise levels j ∈ N. If g's noise level is already at least j (e.g., because g is the output of reRand j ), then randomization fails. We note that the distributions reRand j (g) and reRand j (h) are statistically close for any two encodings g, h with g grp = h and noise level less than j. -ext(g) denotes the canonical bitstring extracted from encoding g. We have ext(g) = ext(h) for any g, h with g grp = h of sufficiently small noise level.
Like [13] , we omit parameters (such as noise bounds) to computations; asymptotic parameters can be derived from the suggestions in [13, Section 4.2].
Hard problems. The -MDDH assumption is: given (g, g x1 , . . . , g x +1 ), (for g ← G 1 and uniform exponents x i ), the element e(g x1 , . . . , g x )
x +1 ∈ G is computationally indistinguishable from a uniform G -element. The ( + 1)-power assumption is: given (g, g x ) (for g ← G 1 and uniform x), the element
x ∈ G is computationally indistinguishable from a uniformly chosen G -element.
We further ignore a (negligible) error probability in most of the GGH procedures. Technically, however, this leads to applications with, e.g., negligible correctness error. 7 Technically, the GGH isZero procedure only allows to compare two encodings on the "highest level" . To compare two level-i encodings (for i < ), we can first "lift" both to level by pairing them with a nonzero level-( − i) element. 8 We note that in the GGH setting, all elements g x i (resp. g x ), and the challenge e(g x 1 , . . . , g x ) x +1 ) (resp. e(g x , . . . , g x ) x ) are produced with knowledge of the exponents x, xi as fully randomized but low-noise encodings.
3 Programmable hash functions in the multilinear setting
Motivation
Programmable hash functions (PHFs) have been defined in [18] as a special type of a group hash function (i.e., a hash function with images in a group). Namely, the image H(X) of a PHF can always be explained as
for externally given c, h. Usually, c will be a "challenge element" (e.g., from a Diffie-Hellman-like problem), and h will be a "controlled element" (e.g., with known exponent relative to a fixed group generator) used for blinding purposes. Intuitively, we require that both the events a X = 0 and a X = 0 occur with significant probability. Even more, an (m, n)-PHF guarantees that with significant probability, a Xi = 0 for any m given inputs X i , while a Zj = 0 for any n given inputs Z j (with X i = Z j of course). This means that the H(X i ) contain no challenge component, while all H(Z j ) do.
For our purposes, we will strive to construct efficient (poly, n)-PHFs for constant n (i.e., group hash functions which are (q(k), n)-PHFs for any polynomial q). However, there are indications that such PHFs do not exist [17] , at least according to the original definition from [18] . Thus, we will adapt the definition of PHFs to the multilinear setting, and construct the "multilinear analog" of a (poly, n)-PHF. Concretely, an (m, n)-PHF maps to a "target" group G . Here instead of explaining H(X) as a product c a X h b X for c, h in the target group G (as the case of PHFs), we will explain H(X) as a product e(c 1 , . . . , c ) a X e(B X , h), for externally given challenges c i ∈ G 1 (which means c = e(c 1 , . . . , c ) ∈ G ) and controlled h ∈ G 1 . Note that the coefficient b X in the usual definition of a PHF now becomes a preimage B X ∈ G −1 under a pairing operation.
Definitions
Definition 1 (Group hash function). A group hash function H into G consists of two polynomial-time algorithms: the probabilistic algorithm HGen(1 k ) outputs a key hk , and HEval(hk , X) (for a key hk and X ∈ {0, 1} k ) deterministically outputs an image H hk (X) ∈ G.
Definition 2 (MPHF).
Assume an -group system MPG as generated by MG (1 k ). Let H be a group hash function into G ( ≤ ), and let m, n ∈ N.
We say that H is an (m, n)-programmable hash function in the multilinear setting ((m, n)-MPHF) if there are PPT algorithms TGen and TEval as follows.
) outputs a key hk and a trapdoor td . We require that for all c i , h, the distribution of hk is statistically close to the output of HGen.
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-TEval(td , X) (for a trapdoor td and X ∈ {0, 1} k ) deterministically outputs a X ∈ Z and B X ∈ G −1 with H hk (X) grp = e(c 1 , . . . , c ) a X · e(B X , h). We require that there is a polynomial p(k) such that for all hk and X 1 , . . . , X m , (2) where the probability is over possible trapdoors td output by TGen along with the given hk . Furthermore, we require that P hk ,{Xi},{Zj } is close to statistically independent of hk . (Formally, |P hk ,{Xi},{Zj } − P hk ,{Xi},{Zj } | ≤ ν(k) for all hk , hk in the range of TGen, all {X i }, {Z j }, and negligible ν(k).) We say that H is a (poly, n)-MPHF if it is a (q(k), n)-MPHF for every polynomial q(k), analogously for (m, poly)-MPHFs.
Note that the TEval algorithm of an MPHF into G 1 yields B X ∈ G 0 , i.e., exponents B X . In fact, in this case, the MPHF definition coincides with the original PHF definition from [18] .
Readers interested only in how to use MPHFs in cryptographic constructions may safely skip the remainder of this section.
Warmup: programmable random oracles as MPHFs
A programmable random oracle RO with images in G 1 can be interpreted as a group hash function in the obvious way. (By "programmable", we mean that during a security proof, we can freely and adaptively determine images of RO, even depending on the inputs of TGen. The only restriction of this programming is that images should appear uniformly and independently distributed to an adversary who sees only public information.) However, note for this modeling to make sense in the first place, we should require that we can hash into G 1 .
Theorem 1 (PROs as (poly, n)-MPHFs). A programmable random oracle
RO (in the above sense) with images in G 1 can be programmed to act as a (poly, n)-MPHF for any constant n.
Proof (Proof sketch.). Fix a polynomial q = q(k). We show that RO is a (q, n)-MPHF (with empty hk ). For each new preimage X, we program RO(X) := c a X h B X for the inputs c := c 1 and h to TGen, and a uniformly chosen exponent
We choose a X = 1 with probability 1/2q, and a X = 0 otherwise. TEval outputs these a X , B X , assigning them as necessary for previously unqueried inputs X. For any pairwise different X 1 , . . . , X q , Z 1 , . . . , Z n , we thus have
which is significant for polynomial q and constant n.
Ingredient: efficient admissible hash functions
At the heart of our standard-model constructions lies a primitive dubbed "admissible hash function" (AHF) [3] . Unfortunately, the AHFs from [3] are not very efficient (and in fact only achieve a weaker AHF definition, see [8] ). However, luckily, an earlier work by Lysyanskaya [19] already contains an implicit and much more efficient AHF. Intuitively, an AHF can be thought of as a combinatorial counterpart of (poly, 1)-(M)PHFs. An AHF input X is mapped to an image AHF(X) in a way that X can fall in the set of controlled, CO, inputs (meaning that we know a trapdoor that allows to answer adversary's queries for that input) or uncontrolled, UN, inputs (meaning that we do not know any trapdoor but hope to embed a challenge element). (Unlike with (M)PHFs, however, this is a purely combinatorial property.) An AHF guarantees that for any X 1 , . . . , X q , Z, with significant probability, all X i are controlled, and Z is uncontrolled.
We now give a definition that is a somewhat simpler variant of the AHF definitions from [8, 1] , and then show a result implicit in [19] .
Definition 3 (AHF). For a function AHF : {0, 1}
k → R (with a finite set
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R and polynomial = (k)) and K ∈ (R ∪ {⊥}) , define the function
11 We say that AHF is q-admissible if there exists a PPT algorithm KGen and a polynomial p(k), such that for all X 1 , . . . , X q , Z ∈ {0, 1} k with Z ∈ {X i },
where the probability is over K ← KGen(1 k ). We say that AHF is an admissible hash function (AHF) if AHF is q-admissible for all polynomials q = q(k).
Thus, X is controlled (i.e., F K (X) = CO) if there is an i with X i = K i = ⊥.
Theorem 2 ([19]
). Assume a family of codes {C k } with C k : {0, 1} k → R denoting both the code and its encoding function. Suppose that C k has minimum distance at least c · for a fixed constant c > 0. (That is,
Proof. Let q = q(k) be a polynomial. We need to devise a PPT algorithm KGen such that (3) holds.
, and picks K uniformly among all elements from (R ∪ {⊥}) with exactly d non-⊥ components. Hence, the set I :
For any fixed i, we want to upper bound the prob-
. (This step loosely corresponds to [19, Lemma 4].) Hence, assume F K (Z) = UN; note that this conditioning leaves the distribution of I uniform. Now C k (X i ) and
A union bound over i gives Pr [∀i :
, which is significant.
Main result: MPHFs from multilinear maps
Our main result in this section is a simple construction of a (poly, n)-MPHF from an AHF.
Construction 1 (MM). Let AHF : {0, 1}
k → R be an admissible hash function and assume an -group system MPG . The group hash function MM into G ( ≤ ) is given by the following algorithms:
and outputs hk := {h i,j } i∈[ ],j∈R .
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-HEval(hk , X) computes (t 1 , . . . , t ) := AHF(X) and outputs MM hk (X) := e(h 1,t1 , . . . , h ,t ).
Theorem 3. The group hash function MM above is a (poly, 1)-MPHF.
Proof. Fix a polynomial q = q(k). We need to exhibit TGen and TEval algorithms as in Definition 2. TGen(1 k , c 1 , . . . , c , h) invokes K ← KGen(1 k ) and, for all (i, j) ∈ [ ] × R and uniform exponents r i,j = 0, it sets up
For now, assume c i grp = 1 for all i, so our setup yields a perfectly distributed key hk := {h i,j } i,j that is in fact independent of K. 13 The trapdoor is td :
TEval(td , X) computes (t 1 , . . . , t ) := AHF(X) and distinguishes two cases:
Case F K (X) = CO, i.e., there is at least an i * with K i * = t i * and K i * = ⊥. If we set a X = 0 and
for any chosen i * , we can decompose MM hk (X) grp = e(c 1 , . . . , c ) a X e(B X , h).
a X e(B X , h) for a X = i r i,ti and B X := 1. The AHF property (3) 
a X e(B X , h) with arbitrary a X . Adjusting the probability for a X = 0 in the order of 1/2q (as in the proof of Theorem 1) allows to prove (2) 
Examples. For R = {0, 1} and binary codes C k : {0, 1} k → R with large minimum distance, we get the AHF implicit in [19] . This yields MPHFs that use O(k) groups G i , and have keys of 2k group elements. Larger R give new AHFs that yield MPHFs that use fewer groups, but have larger keys. For instance, with R = F 2 κ , for κ := log 2 (k) , along with MDS codes over R, we obtain MPHFs that use O(k/ log 2 (k)) groups, and have keys consisting of k 2 group elements.
Theorem 4. Let n be a constant, q = q(k) be a polynomial, and let H = (HGen, HEval) be a (q + n − 1, 1)-MPHF into G . Then the group hash function H = (HGen , HEval ) with -HGen (1 k ) that outputs hk = (hk ν ) ν∈[n] for hk ν ← HGen(1 k ), and -HEval (hk , X) that outputs H hk (X) :
Combining Theorems 3 and 4 yields a (poly, n)-MPHF for any constant n.
Proof. We construct suitable TGen and TEval algorithms from the respective TGen and TEval algorithms for H:
, and outputs hk := (hk ν ) ν∈[n] and td := (td ν ) ν∈[n] .
-TEval (hk , X) invokes (a ν,X , B ν,X )) ← TEval(td ν , X) and outputs a X := ν∈[n] a ν,X and B X := ν∈[n] B ν,X . This output can be justified with
Now fix X 1 , . . . , X q , Z 1 , . . . , Z n with {X i } ∩ {Z j } = ∅. For each ν, we hope for the following event: a ν,Xi = 0 for all i, and a ν,Zj = 0 exactly for j = ν.
For fixed ν, this event happens with probability at least 1/p(k) (over td ν ) for some polynomial p. Since a X = ν a ν,X , we get that with probability at least (1/p(k)) n , we have a Xi = 0 for all i and a Zj = a j,Zj = 0 for all j.
(Hierarchical) ID-based non-interactive key exchange
Hierarchical identity-based non-interactive key exchange (H-ID-NIKE) is the natural generalisation of ID-NIKE [23, 11, 20] to the hierarchical setting: a root authority calculates and distributes private keys to sub-authorities, who in turn do the same for sub-sub-authorities, and so on, until leaf nodes are reached. Each node is identified by a vector of identities, and any pair of nodes in the tree should be able to non-interactively compute a common key based on their private keys and identities. We recall from the introduction that H-ID-NIKE schemes are rare, and, to the best of our knowledge, there are not even any ROM constructions that meet all the desirable criteria (efficiency, scalability, and full security in the sense of resilience to arbitrary node compromises).
Formally, an H-ID-NIKE scheme H-ID-NIKE consists of three PPT algorithms (see below), an identity space ID and shared-key space SHK. The users are organized in a tree of depth L whose root (at level 0) is the trusted authority (TA). The identity of a user at level
is run by the TA. Given the security parameter 1 k and a parameter L ∈ N, it outputs a master public key mpk and a master secret key msk . We also interpret msk as the user secret key usk ε for the empty identity ε. Key delegation. The key delegation algorithm Del(mpk , usk id , id ) can be run by any user to generate a secret key for any of its children. Given the master public key mpk , the user secret key usk id for an identity id = (id 1 , . . . , id d ) ∈ ID d , the algorithm outputs a user secret key usk id for any of its children
. Shared key generation. Given the master public key mpk , a user secret key usk id1 for an identity id 1 ∈ ID ≤L , and an identity id 2 ∈ ID ≤L , ShK(mpk , usk id1 , id 2 ) outputs either a shared key K id1,id2 ∈ SHK or a failure symbol ⊥. (If id 1 is an ancestor of id 2 (or vice-versa) the algorithm is assumed to always output ⊥ 14 ; here, id is in particular considered to be an ancestor of itself. Otherwise the output is assumed to be in SHK.)
For correctness, we require that for any k, L ∈ N, for any (mpk , msk ) ← Setup(1 k , L), for any pair of identities (id 1 , id 2 ) ∈ ID d1 × ID d2 , such that neither is an ancestor of the other, and corresponding user secret keys usk id1 and usk id2 generated by repeated applications of Del from usk ε = msk , we have ShK(mpk , usk id1 , id 2 ) = ShK(mpk , usk id2 , id 1 ).
A (non-hierarchical) ID-NIKE scheme is a H-ID-NIKE scheme in which the depth L of the tree is fixed to L = 1. (Note that in this case, Del gets as input usk ε = msk and outputs user secret keys for level-1 identities. We may thus also speak of extraction of user secret keys.)
Security definition for (H-)ID-NIKE
We present a security model for H-ID-NIKE that is the natural generalisation of the PS model for ID-NIKE from [20] to the hierarchical setting. The model significantly strengthens the previous model of Gennaro et al. [14] by being fully adaptive, allowing arbitrary numbers of node corruptions, and allowing the adversary access to shared keys as well as user secret keys of inner (i.e., non-leaf) nodes. The model is defined in terms of a game between an adversary A and a challenger C. C takes as input the security parameter 1 k and a depth L, runs algorithm Setup of the H-ID-NIKE scheme and gives A the master public key mpk. It keeps the master secret key, msk, to itself. A then makes queries of the following three types:
. C uses Del repeatedly, starting from msk , to derive usk id and hands usk id to A. Reveal : Here A supplies a pair (id 1 , id 2 ) ∈ ID d1 × ID d2 . C extracts usk id1 as above, runs K id1,id2 ← ShK(mpk , usk id1 , id 2 ), and hands K id1,id2 to A. Finally, A outputs a guessb for b. In our security model, the adversary is allowed to make an arbitrary (but polynomial) number of Extract and Reveal queries. Furthermore, the adversary is fully adaptive, in the sense that it can compromise nodes (by making Extract and/or Reveal queries) in any order. In order to prevent the adversary from trivially winning, we require that the adversary is not allowed to make any Extract queries on an ancestor of id * 
We say that H-ID-NIKE is IND-SK secure iff Adv

IND-SK
A,H-ID-NIKE (k) is negligible for all PPT adversaries A.
In the non-hierarchical case (i.e., L = 1), we recover the definition and security model for (non-hierarchical) ID-NIKE from [20] . Note also that versions of these models in which multiple Test queries are permitted for a single bit b can be shown to be polynomially equivalent to the versions with a single Test query using standard hybrid arguments.
Fully-secure ID-NIKE from MPHFs
In this section we revisit the ID-NIKE scheme of Sakai, Ohgishi and Kasahara (SOK) [23] . We replace random oracles with (poly, 2)-MPHFs in their scheme and prove security of the generalized scheme. Using our standard-model MPHFs, this yields the first standard-model ID-NIKE scheme. 15 We then consider a hierarchical generalisation.
We assume a 2 -group system MPG 2 = {{G i } i∈ [2 ] , p, {e i,j } i,j≥1,i+j≤2 } generated by a multilinear maps parameter generator MG 2 (1 k ), and a (poly, 2)-MPHF H = (HGen, HEval) with input length in {0, 1} k and output in G . The component algorithms of our ID-NIKE scheme IDNIKE MPHF are then defined in Figure 1 . (For compatibility with existing notation, we present an extraction algorithm Ext instead of an equivalent delegation algorithm.) Correctness of the scheme is easy to verify. We now prove security. Proof. Assume an IND-SK adversary A against IDNIKE MPHF . We construct a (2 + 1)-power distinguisher B that, given a 2 -group system MPG 2 , and group elements g, g x ∈ G 1 and S ∈ G 2 , distinguishes between S grp = e(g, . . . , g)
(i.e., S is real), and random S.
Concretely, B will internally simulate A, together with the IND-SK experiment. Let id * 1 , id * 2 be the identities from A's Test query. Furthermore, let q = q(k) be a polynomial upper bound on the total number of identities id i ∈ {id * 1 , id * 2 } that appear in A's Extract and Reveal queries. In the following, we will use the (q, 2)-MPHF property of H (and the corresponding algorithms TGen and TEval). B first runs (hk , td ) ← TGen(1 k , g x , . . . , g x , g) and and sets mpk := (MPG 2 , hk ). Implicitly, we will have msk := x.
We will first describe how B answers an Extract(id ) query of A. If a id = 0 (for (a id , B id ) := TEval(td , id )), then B can compute usk id ← reRand 3 (e(B id , g x )) grp = H hk (id ) msk . Otherwise, B aborts with output 0. We will hope for the event that a idi = 0 for all q identities id i ∈ {id * 1 , id * 2 } from B's Extract and Reveal queries. In that case, B can answer not only all Extract queries from A, but also all Reveal queries (by first computing the user secret key usk id of one of the two involved identities, and then using usk id to compute the shared key).
We will additionally hope for a id * 1 , a id * 2 = 0; in this case, B can embed its own challenge into the reply K * to A's Test query as
. (5) By using Hence, B breaks the (2 +1)-power assumption iff A breaks the IND-SK security of IDNIKE MPHF . However, in the general case, abort might not be independent of the id i and id * i . Hence, we will have to resort to an "artificial abort" strategy as in [24] . That is, even if a idi = 0 and a id * i = 0 for all i, B will "artificially" abort with probability 1 − 1/(P (idi),(id * i ) · p(k)) for the polynomial p(k) from (3) and
. This keeps the (new) abort probability at 1/p(k), independently of the id i and id * i , and enables an analysis as above. Unfortunately, in the general case, we can only approximate P (idi),(id * i ) (up to an inversely polynomial error, by running TEval with freshly generated keys sufficiently often), which introduces an additional error term in the analysis. We refer to [24] for details on the artificial abort technique.
A variant secure under a weaker assumption. We can also construct an ID-NIKE scheme in the standard model using two instances (with keys hk 1 , hk 2 ) of a (poly, 1)-MPHF instead of a single instance of a (poly, 2)-MPHF. Shared keys are computed as K := ext(e (H hk 1 (id 1 ) msk , H hk 2 (id 2 ))); user secret keys are of the form usk id = (reRand 3 (H hk 1 (id ) msk ), reRand 3 (H hk 2 (id ) msk )). The benefit of this variant is that it is possible to prove security under the 2 -MDDH assumption (as opposed to the potentially stronger (2 +1)-power assumption we use above). The proof is similar to the one above; however, we will hope that a 1,idi = a 2,idi = 0 for all non-challenge queries id i , and that a 1,id * 1 , a 2,id * 2 = 0 and a 1,id * 2 = a 2,id * 1 = 0, where (a j,id , B j,id ) = TEval(td j , id ).
Extension to H-ID-NIKE
We can extend our ID-NIKE scheme to a H-ID-NIKE scheme of constant depth L. To this end, we work in a 2 L-group system MPG 2 L , and use L instances of a (poly, 2)-MPHF H into G . The resulting H-ID-NIKE scheme, denoted by HIDNIKE MPHF , is given in Figure 2 . In that description, and in the following, we write id i := (id 1 , . . . , id i ) for an identity id = (id 1 , . . . , id d ) and i ≤ d. We assume that all involved identities (including "shortened identities" id i ) can be uniquely encoded as k-bit strings. (If this is not the case, we can always first apply a collision-resistant hash function.) Fig. 2 . The H-ID-NIKE scheme HIDNIKE MPHF .
Note. msk = usk ε = x ∈ Zp = G0, so Del can be used to derive level-1 user secret keys from msk . (Recall that our definition of e is consistent with the implicit exponent group G0 = Zp; e.g., e(x, g) = g x for x ∈ G0.)
We postpone a proof of the following theorem to Appendix C.
Theorem 6 (Security of the MPHF-based H-ID-NIKE scheme
A more efficient variant in the random oracle model. We can replace the 2 L-group system with a 2L-group system and the L different MPHFs with a random oracle hashing into G 1 in the above scheme HIDNIKE MPHF to obtain a second H-ID-NIKE scheme which can be proven secure in the random oracle model. In this case, the 2L-group system can be instantiated with smaller parameters than the 2 L-group system required in our standard model scheme. Security with multiple TAs and group-ID-NIKE. We can also achieve security in the more general setting of multiple trusted authorities and shared keys that can be computed by groups of parties instead of just pairs. The details can be found in Appendix B.
IBE and signature schemes from MPHFs
Identity-based encryption. An identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme IBE with identity space ID and message space M consists of four PPT algorithms: Gen, Ext, Enc, Dec. Key generation Gen(1 k ), on input a security parameter 1 k , outputs a master public key mpk and a master secret key msk . Key extraction Ext(msk , id ), given msk and an identity id ∈ ID, outputs a user secret key usk id . Encryption Enc(mpk , id , M ), given mpk , an identity id ∈ ID, and a message M ∈ M, outputs a ciphertext C. Decryption Dec(usk id , C), given usk id and a ciphertext C, outputs a message M ∈ M ∪ {⊥}. For correctness, we require that
IBE-IND-CPA security. An IBE scheme IBE as above is IBE-IND-CPA secure iff every PPT adversary A succeeds in the following experiment with probability at most negligibly larger than 1/2. First, A gets an honestly generated master public key mpk ; in all of the following, A has access to an Ext(msk , ·) oracle for the corresponding msk . Next, A selects an identity id * ∈ ID and two equal-length messages M 0 , M 1 ∈ M. The experiment then computes C * ← Enc(mpk , id * , M b ) for uniformly chosen b ← {0, 1} and sends C * to A. Finally, A outputs a guess b and succeeds iff b = b and it has not queried Ext with id * .
IBE from (poly, 1)-MPHFs. Figure 3 depicts IBE MPHF , which is the BonehFranklin IBE scheme [4] , implemented with (poly, 1)-MPHFs. Message and identity space are M = ID = {0, 1} k . We assume an ( +1)-group system MPG +1 = {{G i } i∈[ +1] , p, {e i,j } i,j≥1,i+j≤ +1 } generated by a multilinear maps parameter generator MG +1 (1 k ), and a (poly, 1)-MPHF H into G . If we take a random oracle as (poly, 1)-MPHF (as in Theorem 1), then = 1, and we get the original BF scheme. Correctness of IBE MPHF is easy to verify. We now prove its security: Proof sketch. Assume an IBE-IND-CPA adversary A on IBE MPHF that makes q Ext queries. We construct an ( + 1)-MDDH distinguisher B that internally simulates the IBE-IND-CPA experiment for A. B gets as input an ( + 1)-group system MPG +1 and group elements g, g x1 , . . . , g
where either S grp = e(g x1 , . . . , g x +1 )
x +2 (i.e., S is real ) or S ∈ G +1 uniform (i.e.,
S is random). B sets up the master public key as mpk :
). (Here, we use the (q, 1)-MPHF property of H, and the corresponding TGen and TEval algorithms.) B can answer an Ext query of A for identity id i precisely when a idi = 0 (i.e., TEval(td , id i ) = (0, B idi ) for some B idi ): then,
Conversly, we hope that a id * = 0 for A's selected challenge identity id * . Then, we can embed our ( + 1)-MDDH challenge S ∈ G +1 as * . An analysis using an "artificial abort" step is necessary that enforces an abort probability that is (almost) independent of the id i and id * . The details are as in the proof of Theorem 5. Extension to HIBE. We can extend the above IBE scheme to a hierarchical IBE (HIBE) scheme of constant depth D. This generalization works similarly as in the ID-NIKE case. We postpone a more detailed exposition to Appendix A. (Hierarchical) signatures from (poly, 1)-MPHFs. We can convert any (H)IBE scheme into a (hierarchical) signature scheme using the techniques of [4, 15, 10] . If we apply this transformation to IBE MPHF above, we obtain an abstraction of BLS signatures [7] . Indeed, if we instantiate the involved MPHF with a random oracle, we get the original BLS scheme. On the other hand, if we use the standard-model MPHF from Theorem 3, we obtain (a slight variant of) the signature scheme of Boneh and Silverberg [5] . In fact, with suitable parameters (i.e., a larger R, see Section 3.5), we obtain a signature scheme that uses only O(k/ log(k)) groups and multilinear operations (as opposed to O(k) groups and multilinear operations in the Boneh-Silverberg scheme). It seems natural to expect that, using the techniques of [22] , this also yields an aggregatable signature scheme.
, outputs a user secret key usk id for identity id . Given the master public key mpk , an identity id ∈ ID ≤D , and a message M ∈ M, Enc(mpk , id , M ) outputs a ciphertext C. The decryption algorithm Dec(usk id , C), given the user secret key usk id for an identity id ∈ ID ≤D , and a ciphertext C, outputs a message M ∈ M ∪ {⊥}. For correctness, we re-
≤D such that id is a prefix of id , all usk id ← Del(mpk , usk id , id ), all M ∈ M, and all
HIBE-IND-CPA security. For D ∈ N a HIBE scheme HIBE as above is HIBE-IND-CPA-secure iff in the following experiment the success probability of every PPT adversary A is at most negligibly larger than 1/2. First, the experiment runs Gen(1 k , D) to obtain a master public mpk and a master secret key msk . Then, A receives mpk and outputs a challenge identity id * and messages M 0 , M 1 of equal length. During the whole experiment, A can query user secret keys for identities of its choice. The experiment answers these queries by iterating Del. (Note that from msk the experiment can derive any user secret key in the hierarchy.) After handing out a prepared ciphertext C * ← Enc(mpk , id * , M b ) with uniformly chosen b ← {0, 1} to A, the adversary outputs a guess b . If b = b and A never queried a user secret key for id * the adversary succeeds.
Extension to HIBE. We can extend our IBE scheme IBE MPHF to a HIBE of constant depth D. We work in a (D + 1)-group system MPG D +1 , and use D instances of a (poly, 1)-MPHF H into G . The resulting HIBE scheme HIBE MPHF = (Gen, Del, Enc, Dec) with message space M is given in Figure 4 . For simplicity, we assume an identity space ID such that all involved (potentially multi-level) identities can be uniquely encoded as k-bitstrings. (Larger identities can be used if any identity is first hashed using a collision-resistant hash function.) As in our H-ID-NIKE scheme, we have msk = usk ε = x ∈ Z p = G 0 ; so from msk we can delegate level-1 user secret keys using Del. (In case of an RO as (poly, 1)-MPHF, we get an efficient and simple HIBE in the ROM.) Again, the scheme's correctness is easy to verify. We now turn to the security theorem of HIBE MPHF . 
). Implicitly, we have msk := x D +1 . To answer user secret key queries for id = (id 1 , . . . , id d ) we hope for a id := i∈[d] a id i = 0, where (a id i , B id i ) := TEval(td i , id i ). Thus, we have a id i * = 0 for some i * and we can compute the user secret key
,
Conversely, we hope that a id * :
); for C 2 consider the group element
whose bit representation (extracted via ext) is used to blind the challenge message M b . We can embed B's own challenge S into (6) since (6) contains an implicit e(g x1 , . . . , g
·a id * -factor in (6), which can be replaced by S a id * . The remaining 2 d * − 1 factors of (6) can be computed as during user secret key extraction.
As an example, assume decompositions
Now, back to the general case, C * is a valid encryption of
x D +2 . Else, for uniform S ∈ G D +1 , the ciphertext C * contains no information about b. Further, if B has to abort because of a idi = 0 for some i or a id * = 0 for the challenge identity id * , then B ouputs 0. Otherwise, if the adversary guesses b correctly, B ouputs 1. Again, the event that B aborts might not be independent of id i for some i and id * . Hence, we have to implement an artificial abort step such that the probability of aborting B's simulation is (almost) independent of the id i and id * . This is done as in the proof of Theorem 5.
B (H-)ID-NIKE with multiple TAs and group-H-ID-NIKE
Multilinear maps are sufficiently powerful to allow further, powerful generalisations of our (H)-ID-NIKE construction. In particular, we may consider a situation where we have multiple TAs, each issuing secret keys to (a hierarchy of) users, and we wish to enable any pair of users with secret keys issued by possibly different TAs to be able to compute a shared key. Going further, we may wish to enable groups of users (rather than just pairs of users) in the "forest" of hierarchies to compute shared keys. All of this is enabled in the multilinear setting by generalisation of our ID-NIKE and H-ID-NIKE schemes. For simplicity, we sketch just one such scheme here, leaving detailed development of these ideas to future work. Suppose we have a 3-group system and let H be a random oracle with outputs in G 1 . Then we can instantiate our ID-NIKE scheme with the MPHF being replaced by H and with secret keys of the form usk id,i ← reRand 2 (H(id ) msk i ) ∈ G The first computation in the chain can be carried out by user id 1 using its secret key issued by TA 1 , while the last can be done by id 2 using its secret key issued by TA 2 ; thus the pairing output can be used as the basis of a shared key (by applying ext in the usual way). Hence two users with secret keys issued by different TAs can still compute a shared key non-interactively. It should be evident how to generalise this simple scheme a) to the standard model, b) to greater numbers of users and TAs, and c) to the hierarchical setting, all by working with -group systems.
C Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 5; we focus on the necessary adaptations. We construct a (2 L + 1)-power distinguisher from an IND-SK adversary A. Assume B gets a 2 L-group system MPG 2 L and group elements g, g
x ∈ G 1 and S ∈ G 2 L as input, and is supposed to distinguish the 
from which the shared key is computed, contains an e( 2 L times g x , . . . , g x ) x -factor, which can be replaced by B's own challenge S; the remaining 2 d1+d2 − 1 factors of (7) can be computed as in (5) .
Hence, B's simulation requires that a id = 0 for all non-challenge queried identities id, and a id * 1 , a id * 2 = 0. It will be sufficient to hope for a id * j, i = 0 for all prefixes of the challenge identities, and a id i = 0 for all other involved prefixes.
(Since no prefixes of the challenge identities will need to be extracted, these requirements are not contradictory.) These requirements translate to requirements on the L individual MPHF instances. Hence, with probability at least (1/p(k)) L (for the polynomial p(k) from (2)), the simulation will not abort.
The remaining analysis (including a necessary artificial abort step) can be performed as in the proof of Theorem 5.
